Social divides on climate change are often attributed to political factors, but new psychological research points to a wide range of group influences beyond politics that shape public opinion on climate change. We highlight two commonly overlooked sources of influence that represent key underutilized leverage points for public outreach: (1) the roles of racial, ethnic, and cultural identities and (2) the power of social perceptions (i.e., meta-beliefs) in mobilizing public action. This research points to an urgent need to broaden how scientists, policymakers, and the media think about public engagement and consensus building in the domain of climate change.
. Within the United States, the public divide on climate change is often framed as an ideological battle between liberals who are more likely to believe in anthropogenic climate change and support mitigation policies and conservatives who are more skeptical. Indeed, political polarization has steadily increased within the United States and some European nations over the past decade (Capstick, Whitmarsh, Poortinga, Pidgeon, & Upham, 2015) , and both skeptics and believers-including scientists-now view themselves as members of distinct communities, with shared goals, values, and beliefs that conflict with those of the other side (Bliuc et al., 2015) . These social divides substantially hinder national and international efforts to develop and implement solutions that are urgently needed to meet key emissions-reduction targets (Edenhofer et al., 2014) . But disproportionate attention to the partisan gap by the media, advocacy groups, and the scientific community masks other important social-motivational factors that also impact public engagement on climate change.
Findings from studies using national probability samples, as well as new psychological research, shed light on some of these complex and often hidden social motives. Psychological science offers theoretical and methodological tools that uniquely position it within the social sciences to inform our understanding the myriad social motivations beyond partisan politics that drive public opinion on climate change. Although social psychological research on climate change has lagged that of other social sciences, with much of the empirical research emerging since 2010, interest and momentum within the field is growing rapidly (see Fielding, Hornsey, & Swim, 2014) . Drawing from this work, we highlight two commonly overlooked sources of group influence beyond partisan politics that represent underutilized leverage points for public outreach and consensus building: (1) the roles of racial, ethnic, and cultural identities and values and (2) the power of social perception (i.e., perceptions of others' beliefs) in mobilizing public action.
Identity and Ideology Beyond the Political Divide
Since 1990, U.S. survey data show the emergence of a racial and ethnic gap on environmental concern, including concern about global warming, that is now comparable in size to the ideological gap between liberals and conservatives and greater than the partisan gap between Democrats and Republicans, with nonWhite minorities expressing higher levels of concern compared to Whites (Guber, 2013) . Similar gaps are now seen for gender and income, such that women and lower income respondents are expressing greater concern than men and higher income respondents (Guber, 2013; Scruggs & Benegal, 2012) . In the United States, these groups differ in their real and perceived vulnerability to environmental hazards, and particularly impacts on communities (Mohai, 2008) .
Thus, when it comes to climate change, members of minority groups, who are both more vulnerable and more aware of potential environmental impacts, may be motivated by concerns that are less rooted in political orientation.
In a large-scale national probability study, we found that public opinion about climate change may be less politically polarized for racial and ethnic minorities in the United States relative to Whites (Schuldt & Pearson, 2015) . Most strikingly, political ideology, a variable that strongly predicts climate polarization in the United States, was far less predictive of the climate beliefs of non-Whites relative to Whites. This same pattern held for other opinion metrics that we examined, including belief in scientific consensus and support for mitigation efforts (regulating greenhouse gases). We also found that non-White racial and ethnic minorities were less likely to identity as environmentalists, despite expressing belief in climate change and support for mitigation policies at levels comparable to those of Whites. Other studies have revealed that both Whites and non-Whites perceive environmentalism as socially exclusive, and even more so than other stereotypically White domains (science and engineering professions; see Pearson & Schuldt, 2014) .
These findings have important implications for outreach and advocacy. How people engage with issues of sustainability and advocacy groups may be shaped, in no small part, by their perceived similarity to individuals within these groups. Sustainability researchers and practitioners would, therefore, be wise not to mistake minorities' lower identification as "environmentalists" with a lack of knowledge or concern about sustainability issues. Similarly, advocacy efforts that target ideological disagreements and seek to bridge partisan divisions may be relatively ineffective for groups whose views on the issue are less rooted in political beliefs. Behavioral science research shows that teams with a greater diversity of perspectives and experiences are more innovative (e.g., Hong & Page, 2004; Levine et al., 2014) and, thus, may be better equipped to generate novel solutions that are needed to mitigate and adapt to climate change. In an increasingly diverse society, advocacy aimed at enhancing diversity and inclusion within the climate movement may potentially be more effective at engaging a diverse public and developing solutions for addressing climate change than messages aimed at enhancing awareness of climate change or bridging political divides.
Using Culturally Informed Messages to Motivate Action
Cultural values can also impact how the public responds to mitigation efforts. In a cross-national study, Rattan, Savani, and Romero-Canyas (2015) demonstrate the power of leveraging messages that emphasize cultural values to motivate actions aimed at mitigating climate change. Two experiments tested messages designed to increase airline ticket buyers' intentions to purchase carbon offsets in the United States and India, two of the world's leading carbon-polluting nations. Compared to a neutral frame, appeals emphasizing choice and moral responsibility motivated Americans but not Indians to purchase carbon offsets. In contrast, appeals invoking purity (keeping the nation clean) motivated Indians but not Americans, whereas appeals invoking social change (supporting movements to improve society) motivated both groups. Other research has found that differences in political orientation generate less disagreement in perceptions of climate risks than do differences in hierarchical and individualistic worldviews, which have been found to vary between Eastern and Western nations (Kahan et al., 2012; Morling & Lamoreaux, 2008) .
These findings highlight the dangers of failing to consider how messages that resonate within some nations may fail, or even backfire, in international contexts. Climate change cannot be addressed without public mobilization and broad buy-in from the international community. Yet much of the existing research on factors that motivate action on climate change comes mainly from Western nations. Climate researchers and advocacy groups should consider how the same appeals may be differentially received across different cultural contexts where sometimes competing cultural values may affect public receptiveness to mitigation efforts.
Can the Real Motivation Please Stand Up?
Research suggests that partisan disagreements on climate change may often be rooted in group conformity pressures and concerns about what others believe ("meta-beliefs"; Ding, Maibach, Zhao, Roser-Renouf, & Leiserowitz, 2011) rather than fixed ideological views, which may be more malleable than previously assumed. In a striking demonstration of the impact of group conformity pressures on ideological beliefs, Cohen (2003) found that both liberals and conservatives in the United States based their attitudes on objective information about social policies when information about their own party's position was absent. But when they were lead to believe that their party had endorsed it, conservatives readily supported a lavish welfare policy, and liberals supported even a highly restrictive one. Moreover, participants were unaware of the biasing effect of party information on their own beliefs, despite readily perceiving the bias in others.
Similar processes may help to explain the polarization of climate beliefs. In a study of Midwestern U.S. voters, Romero-Canyas, Gaby, Silver, and Schneider (2015) found that exposure to a Republican elected official who endorsed acceptance of anthropogenic climate change increased acceptance among Republican voters. Moreover, this change in belief came at no reputational cost to the messenger: participants viewed the politician equally positively whether or not they received the climate change message. Thus, perceptions of others' climate beliefs can sway personal beliefs even when they conflict with deeply held partisan views.
Meta-beliefs about the views of scientists can similarly override partisan views. In a national survey experiment, Van der Linden, Leiserowitz, Feinberg, and Maibach (2015) found that exposure to accurate information about the scientific consensus on human-caused climate change increased both Democrats' and Republicans' estimates of consensus, which predicted key beliefs about climate change and led to increased support for public action. Thus, far from being static, ideological beliefs-including those related to climate changeappear to be highly sensitive to our perceptions of others' beliefs.
Group norms have long been known to shape environmental attitudes and behaviors. A study of household energy users in the U.S. Southwest, for instance, found that information about neighbors' energy use was a more powerful predictor of a given household's energy use than reminders of cost savings or appeals to help protect the environment (Nolan, Schultz, Cialdini, Goldstein, & Griskevicius, 2008 ; see also Allcott, 2011) . However, to whom we tune our beliefs remains an often-overlooked aspect of many communications strategies.
Rethinking the Social Levers for Public Outreach
The above research highlights an urgent need to broaden how scientists, policymakers, and members of the media think about public engagement on climate change and points to new leverage points for engaging diverse stakeholders in decision making. Groups for whom the issue of climate change is less politically charged, such as U.S. racial and ethnic minorities, can serve as key "bridge" audiences for overcoming partisan disagreements and building consensus on policy. Similarly, appeals that resonate with shared cultural values may also prove effective for bridging disagreements within and between nations. This broader conceptualization is long overdue, given that the United States is on track to become a majority-minority nation by 2042 (U.S. Census Bureau, 2010)-a trend also occurring in many nations in Europe and Australasia that are experiencing similar demographic shifts with the arrival of migrants and humanitarian entrants (U.N. Human Development Report, 2009).
With a deeper understanding of the complex social motivations that tune people into (as well as away from) the issue of climate change, scientists, governmental agencies, and advocacy groups will be better equipped to mobilize public support around mitigation efforts and develop communications and initiatives that successfully attract and engage diverse audiences. Perhaps most important, we hope that a broader consideration of social motivations beyond politics will stimulate new research that transcends national boundaries to shed light on the ways that citizens around the globe, not just within the U.S. political context, engage with this truly global threat.
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